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SPEECH

OF

ANDREW STEWART, OF PENN.,

ON THE

PRESIDENTIAL QUESTION;

DELIVERED

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES,

JUNE 26, 1848.

WASHINGTON:

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SPEECH.

Mr. STEWART, in rising, said he did not propose to answer the remarks just made by the gentleman from Mississippi, (Mr. FEATHERSTON,) upon the subject of slavery—a subject on which he never had made, and perhaps never would make, a speech on this floor. Slavery was an evil, and an evil we could not remedy, in that portion of the country where it existed; but it was an evil which he was opposed to extending to any country or territory now free. He thought the discussion of this question had the tendency to give rise to "geographical lines," which would divide the great parties of the country, and might in the end subvert our happy Union. He regretted the drawing of such lines; he thought them dangerous to the harmony and perhaps the integrity of this great confederacy. They were divisions against which we were warned by Washington, the Father of his Country, in his Farewell Address to the people of the United States; whose voice he could never hear with indifference, and to whose warnings he trusted the people of this country would never turn a deaf ear.

There had, however, been introduced into the present discussion another great question—the Presidential question; a question which he regarded at this time as more important than any question of the kind which had ever been presented for the decision of the American people, involving momentous consequences to the welfare of the country, present and prospective. It involved this question, among others: Whether, under the Government as it was now administered, all power was to be concentered in the hands of *one man*, or whether, under other auspices, under the administration of another illustrious man, whose name was before the country, we were to be brought back to the purer and better principles and policy of the fathers of the Republic? It was a question whether all power—the power of the purse and sword, the power of peace and war—was to be exercised by the President; whether, with the *veto power* in his hands, exercising legislative as well as executive power, he was to become supreme in this country, more arbitrary and despotic than any crowned head in Europe, save Nicholas of Russia, and Congress and the people were to dwindle into perfect insignificance; or whether, under the policy of that other great and good man, Gen. Taylor, the people and Congress were to be restored to their legitimate powers, just rights, and proper influence; whether the voice of the people was to be heard and treated with respect, or whether we were to be controlled and governed by "*one man;*" whether the country was to continue, as now, to be governed *by* party and *for* party; or whether, under General Taylor, it was to be governed once more *by* the *people* and *for* the *people;* whether the policy of the Government was to continue to be dictated and *prescribed every four years* by an irresponsible cabal of unprincipled caucusites at Baltimore; whether, at their behest, the great and essential powers of *self-protection* and *self-improvement* were to be surrendered and given up; whether, with a vast standing army and navy, our expenditures were to be doubled, and the people here, as in Europe, crushed under an enormous weight of debt and taxation, and the Government thus changed, *in fact*, if not in form, from a Republic to a *despotism?* These, sir, in my apprehension, are some of the great issues to be decided by the people at the approaching Presidential contest; and so regarding it, I cannot but feel myself called on by every motive of duty and patriotism to exert myself to the full extent of my very humble ability, by every fair and honorable means, to bring this contest to an auspicious result.

Was it to be tolerated that, when across the waters, in Europe, the old world was engaged in putting down the "one-man power," we were to be putting it up here, by giving all power to the Executive; and that, whilst Europe was engaged in building up and establishing republics, we were to be employed in tearing down our neighboring republics of the South? He trusted that we should take a different course; that, under the auspices of that illustrious man whom the Whig party had presented to the country, we should give an example to the world, not of war and of conquest, but of peace—of a people united, prosperous, peaceful, happy. That was the example we owed to the world, and that was the example which we would soon set to the world under a different Administration from this. But going on, as we now were, under the lead of the "one-man power party," we must soon become a warlike people, going on conquering and to conquer. Not only Yucatan and Cuba, but Canada too, and all other territories we should happen to fix our avaricious eye upon, must be conquered and "swallowed" under the great chieftain whom the Progressive Democracy had selected as their leader.

Was this to be the policy which was to be sustained by the people? No, sir. No! A different result was approaching; the misnamed Democracy had selected a leader, and so had the Whigs: the former a general that *always surrenders*, the latter a general that "*never surrenders.*" Under such leaders could the result be doubted? No, it was certain; the contest had in fact been given up. The Union, the "organ" of the Administration, Father Ritchie himself, had given it up. What did the Union tell us? It headed a recent article with "*Will the people endure the* CHEAT?" Mr. Ritchie went on through half a column telling how they were cheated by the Whigs; and in other columns it was cheated, *cheated*, CHEATED! Now, he would like to know what man or party ever cried "cheated" that was not beaten? "Cheat" meant "beat." In 1840, when the Whigs beat the Locos, they cried out "cheated;" in 1844, when the Locos beat, that was the cry of the Whigs; and so when the Union cried "cheated," it admitted they were beaten. "Cheated" was the language of the loser, never of the winner. But Mr. Ritchie had one hope left, and it is this, he says he still hopes that "the best part of the Whigs—the *honest* Whigs—would be able to proclaim and effect a *dissolution* of the Whig party." "Best and honest Whigs;" this must be very flattering to the *anti-Taylor* Whigs, coming as it does from Polk's organ. Best! No, sir, they are the worst, the very worst. They are traitors, locofocos in disguise; but let them go over to the enemy; we can do better without than with them. As Taylor, said of the deserters "drum them out, they belong not to the American Army."

But prudence is the better part of valor. Mr. Ritchie will not wait to be shot; he surrenders in time. He knows Old Zack and Capt. Bragg are sharpshooters, and he no doubt feels a little like Crockett's coon, who from the top of a tree seeing a well-known marksman raising his unerring rifle, said: "Is that you Capt. Scott? If it is, don't shoot; *I'll come down.*" So says Mr. Ritchie: "Is that you, Old Zack? If it is, don't shoot; I'll come down." (Much laughter.)

But, to make bad worse, the next day after this candid confession and surrender, out comes his old friend Van Buren against Mr. Cass. Horrible—"*et tu Brute!*" This rendered the old gentleman quite frantic, and in his next paper we may expect to see him address Mr. Polk in the language of a certain celebrated song, lately applied to a distinguished Senator from New York:

"O carry me back to Old Virginny." (Laughter.)

Mr. STEWART then proceeded to read from one of the articles referred to in the Union, in which it was said that it was unfair for the Whigs to take Taylor. If they had taken Clay, Webster, Scott, McLean, or any other known Whig, he would have been satisfied; but they had selected Old Zack, a "no-

party man," and they (the Democracy) could not keep their men in the ranks; that they would not stand fire; that, like the Mexicans, they were not only retreating, but going over to Taylor, in companies and regiments; that they had not only Barnburners in the North, but Barnburners in the South: the Van Buren men and the Yancey men, the "Alabama Platform men" and the "New York Platform men;" North, South, East, and West, their men were "bolting," bolting, bolting. Now, this Mr. Ritchie said was not fair; "it was a palpable cheat;" the Whigs ought to have nominated Mr. Clay—a man they had often defeated, and could, he supposed, defeat again. This would have been fair; but to take up "Old Zack," a no-party man, the very man who had fought their battles and gained their victories, and saved their Administration from infamy and disgrace, how could the Whigs vote for him? Democrats could do so with propriety. Yes, (said Mr. S.,) and that is exactly what they are going to do. Democrats would vote for him, because he was an honest, true, patriotic, faithful old man, who had risked his life in fighting the battles of the country. The honest, unsophisticated people, not the politicians, but the patriotic *people* of the country, felt and said, "We owe Old Zack a debt of gratitude, and we are not like Mr. Polk, General Cass, and the party in this House, who pay him with kicks and cuffs; we are honest men; we will pay our honest debts; we have no money, but we will pay him in paper; we have a little bit of a ticket, which we will deposite at the polls for him in November next. We don't care what you say, Mr. Ritchie, or what you politicians say to the contrary; he has served his country long and faithfully; and we are going to thank him, and that, too, without Mr. Cass's disgraceful proviso, censuring instead of thanking him for his glorious victory at Monterey." You might as well try to stop the mighty Mississippi in her march to the ocean, as stop these people from voting for "Old Zack;" he is honest, and they are honest; he is *rough*, and they are *rough;* he is always ready to do his duty, and so are they; with all his honors and all his glories he is not lifted up; he is not above a common man; the people know him by his acts; they love him, they will vote for him; they must, they can't help it; he is an honest and pure man. The Government has basely attempted to destroy him, and the people know it. But their machinations against him have failed, signally failed. God protects the virtuous and the good. Heaven is just. The very means resorted to by this Administration and its tools to destroy General Taylor, by robbing him of his men at Buena Vista, and put him, as they thought, completely in the power of Santa Anna, was made by a just Providence the means of elevating him over them—of putting them down and putting him up, and will give him another opportunity of displaying his characteristic magnanimity and forbearance towards his fallen foes.

Sir, we have been repeatedly told during this debate that the Democrats in their Convention at Baltimore had laid down a platform, and they complained that the Whigs had adopted no platform whatever. But he would tell gentlemen the Whigs had a platform, and they had it in General Taylor's Allison letter of the 22d April: and he would proudly contrast that broad, noble, American platform, with the narrow, contracted, party platform adopted at Baltimore. Contrast, sir, these platforms. Ours, like its author, great and national; theirs strictly in character—a miserable party concern. How did Mr. Stevenson, the President of the Baltimore Convention, himself characterize this platform in his letter conveying to General Cass the notice of his nomination? He said: "The platform we present you is broad enough to hold all Democrats, but narrow enough to exclude all others." It was broad enough for the Locofocos; broad enough for the *party;* it was a *party* platform, and nothing else, and so represented and so accepted by General Cass, who pledged himself to carry it out. But look at Old Zack's platform; it was broad enough for the

whole country. He nobly says: I go for the *whole country*—for the whole people; I give no pledges; I make no bargains; I submit to no party dictation; if elected, I will administer the Government for the benefit of the whole American people. And, sir, if he could be induced to come down from that high, noble, patriotic, and national platform, to this contracted, degraded, miserable platform of *party*, he would sink, greatly sink in my esteem, and would justly forfeit the support of thousands and tens of thousands of the patriotic and honest men of all parties, who were now rallying to his standard. No; General Taylor would never come down to such a miserable narrow platform of party as that laid down by the Baltimore Convention, but would honestly and faithfully administer the Government for the benefit of the whole people, and according to the principles of the Constitution, as construed and administered by the early Presidents of the Republic. The first thing they put forth in the Baltimore platform was "Democracy"—they had the NAME without one of the principles. General Cass, and the whole of them, talk about "Jeffersonian Democracy;" and, while they talked about Democracy and about Thomas Jefferson, while they retained the *name*, they repudiated and trampled under foot every principle of Jefferson, every principle adopted and practised upon by all the early Presidents—every one of them, without an exception; they preach one thing and practise the opposite. Their democracy Jeffersonian! Why, sir, they go for the VETO *power*, the great conservative power of *putting down* the will of the people, and *putting up* the will of the President; this *one-man power*, the *veto*, which, as had been well said, was intended as "the extreme medicine of the Constitution," had now become the daily bread of the President. Thomas Jefferson and his illustrious compeers never exercised the veto; he never exercised it in a single instance in the eight years of his Administration. During the first twenty years of the administration of this Government there never was a veto, except in one or two unimportant cases by Gen. Washington; but vetoes, *vetoes*, VETOES, had now become the order of the day. We were now governed by vetoes, and nothing but vetoes. At the last session Congress passed the River and Harbor bill, and sent it to the President, who, afraid to veto it, put it in his breeches pocket; but, at this session, he sent it back with his reasons against it, and this House had voted down those reasons by a vote of 138 to 54—a vote of thirty more than two-thirds! And yet it was no law; it was defeated by the will of *one man*. In England the King, who possessed the veto power, had not dared to exercise it for several hundred years; there some respect was paid to the will of the people; when the House of Commons vote against the ministry, they resign; here, instead of resigning, the King vetoes the popular will, and this was the power General Cass and his party advocated.

What was General Taylor's position in this respect? He held, like a true republican, that with regard to questions of domestic policy "the will of the people, as expressed through their Representatives in Congress, ought to be respected and carried out by the Executive." This was the doctrine of General Taylor—that it was with the people, the democratic people, to govern themselves. Yet, although General Cass and his party in practice sustained and applauded this despotic power of "one man" to defeat the will of the people's Representatives fairly expressed, they talked about "Democracy," while they were riveting chains on the people: they talked about the beauties of economy, while they were doubling and trebling the expenses of Government; they talked loudly about the capability of the people for self-government, and Mr. Cass undertook to say—hear him in his own words, "The very first article in the Democratic creed teaches that the people are competent to govern themselves"—"here is the starting point of the difference between the two great parties that divide the country; all other differences are but subordinate and

auxiliary to this, and may in fact be resolved into it"—this, too, was part of the Baltimore platform. "The people competent to govern themselves;" thus would they flatter and betray; this was the policy of all usurpers—first flatter the people, then betray them. The President, not the people, ought to be sovereign; that was progressive Democracy; the President with one-third of either House ought to have the power to defeat the will of two-thirds of the people and their Representatives. Oh, yes! good people, you are perfectly "competent to govern yourselves"—but to save you from suicide you must allow us to tie your hands; you must submit to the *veto* power—the government of *one man*. This is Democracy—*progressive* Democracy, which means *Aristocracy* first, and *Monarchy* next; their professions were directly contradicted by their practice; they practically denied the competency of the people for self-government by the arbitrary exercise of the veto power. What did this "platform" further say? That this veto power had saved the people from a "system of internal improvements." That it had saved the people—from what? From themselves; from carrying out their own legislation; from using their own money for their own benefit—for the improvement of their own country. They (the President and party) could make war, take $60,000,000 a year into Mexico; they could go all over the world and spend the money of the people, but they would suffer no part of the money to be expended under the direction of the people's Representatives. They denied the power to Congress to spend the people's money for the people's benefit in the improvement of their country, but claimed and freely exercised the power to oppress, tax, and burden the people. That was the practical construction which this party placed upon the Constitution—that the veto was to save the people from themselves; and yet in their platform they said that "the people's money ought to be carefully guarded for the people's benefit." A small mistake—they should have said "the *party's* benefit—a variation merely of theory from practice; for, while they talked about guarding the people's money for the people's benefit, they were actually applying it to the benefit of themselves; and while they said that they were opposed to legislating for "the benefit of the few at the expense of the many," yet this was precisely what they were doing. They were legislating the money from the people's pockets into their own; legislating entirely for the benefit of the few at the expense of the many. Their whole system, in the very face and eyes of their theory, was to enrich the few at the expense of the many; and this he would soon show was a game well understood by their great leader, General Cass himself.

They talked about "economy," and preached it in their platform. They were great economists—the true Thomas Jefferson economists; while, as he had stated, they proscribed and trampled under foot every one of his principles. Thomas Jefferson was the enemy of a national debt. Look at our national debt now, created by this Administration. Mr. Adams administered the Government for twelve and a half millions a year, on the average of his whole term, this sum covering the entire expenses of his Administration, except what was applied to the public debt. Mr. Adams was denounced and put out for his extravagance. Mr. Van Buren came in—this lover of economy, this admirer of Thomas Jefferson—and the expenses of the Government during his Administration ran up to *twenty-eight and a half millions*, instead of twelve and a half. Gentlemen smiled; he defied them to deny it; he challenged them to the records. They might promise to answer, as they had done before, but they would never do it; never, because they could not; the least said the better.

Mr. THOMPSON, of Mississippi, (Mr. S. yielding the floor with some hesitation for one question,) asked if the gentleman did not now stand side by side with Mr. Van Buren?

Mr. STEWART. What! I side by side with Martin Van Buren? [A laugh.] Thank God, I have nothing to do with Martin Van Buren, and never will have. I would ask, if the gentleman himself, who was formerly so ardent a supporter of Mr. Van Buren, was for Mr. Van Buren now? Was he now his candidate? Was he for Van Buren or Cass?

Mr. THOMPSON'S reply was not heard.

Mr. STEWART continued. He said the expenses of the Government had now run up under Mr. Polk to $60,000.000 a year. They had increased from $12,500,000, under Mr. Adams, to $28,500,000 under Mr. Van Buren, and now to $50,000,000 or $60,000,000 under the present "economical" Administration! This was their boasted Jeffersonian "economy;" this was their opposition to a "national debt." Why, they had done nothing but make national debts. Mr. Van Buren had found some $40,000,000 surplus in the Treasury; he had left some $40,000,000 of national debt, after selling seven or eight millions of bank stock. Mr. Polk had found some $17,000,000 of debt, and had or would run it up to one hundred millions of dollars, or over! This was "Democratic" consistency! The people would mark it at the next election. Thomas Jefferson was opposed to a standing army, to a great navy; yet the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. McKAY,) had told the House that the appropriations for the naval service had run up within a few years from $3,000,000 to $11,000,000! And this under this beautiful Jeffersonian Administration, which went by the rule of contrary, looking one way and rowing the other.

He always thought Mr. Jefferson was the friend of peace. What was Gen. Cass? For war, war, war! First with England; he was for "fifty-four forty or fight;" then he was for Mexico; for "swallowing" (to use his own language) the whole of Mexico; next for Yucatan and Cuba; and then he might be for Canada. Now, here was the practice of the gentlemen over the way, and of their leader, who talked so loudly about Mr. Jefferson's principles! Jefferson considered war a barbarism. In this enlightened age and country, it was an absurdity, a crime, and it was so considered by Gen. Taylor, who pronounced "war, at all times, and under all circumstances, a national calamity."

But a little more of the history of General Cass. He had been on all sides of all questions. There was not a question of public policy of the country upon which General Cass had not occupied a position on both sides. Once a Federalist, now a "Democrat;" when the question of the annexation of Texas first came up he was decidedly opposed to it; when it was said the British were going to take Texas, "let them have it," said he, "we do not want it." But a little before the nomination, on the 10th of May, 1844, he wrote a letter to Mr. Hannegan, in which he was for immediate annexation, and for slavery too. He was against annexation and for annexation; against the proviso and for the proviso; against protection and for protection; against internal improvements and for internal improvements; he was the great eulogist of Louis Phillippe when in power, and the very first to mount the rostrum in this city and denounce him when he fell. With reference to the Wilmot proviso, General Cass was decidedly for it at first; he was a great proviso man; and then at the next session of Congress, when he found it would not do for a certain section, he turned against the proviso, and in his letter to Mr. Nicholson said "a change has been going on in my mind;" and when the slaveholders demanded to be allowed to carry their slaves to new territory, he says in this letter it would greatly improve the comfort and condition of the slaves if they were scattered over more territory, and he was now a great slavery man; and the gentleman from Mississippi, (Mr. FEATHERSTON,) had just said he was *pledged* to veto the Wilmot proviso. He was once for a protective tariff, but now opposed to all protection. The time was when General Cass voted for internal improvements; but he wrote an answer to a letter of invitation to attend the Chicago conven-

tion in his neighborhood—a letter of four lines, stating that he *could not attend;* and at Cleveland the other day, when asked for his opinions on internal improvements and the proviso, he said there was such a crowd he was afraid he could not be heard on these subjects, and therefore spoke on others. Now, the Baltimore Convention declared that internal improvements were unconstitutional, and General Cass said—Amen; he agreed to every word in that platform. He was a man who had been on all sides of all questions; a man of no principle, no consistency, but a time-serving, vacillating, weather-cock candidate, and *that* had secured his nomination for the Presidency. But he (Mr. S.) thought his party now felt very much as Father Ritchie did—very much like giving it up. Had the Whig candidate ever vacillated, ever changed his position, his principles? No. They were laid down in the Allison letter, and were fixed as the everlasting hills, having their foundation in justice and truth, based on the Constitution of the country, and upon popular rights; the emanations of a sound head and a pure heart, it was impossible that they could be wrong, or could change. The two candidates differed in this: the one, governed by the rule of *right*, was never wrong; the other, governed by the rule of *expediency*, was rarely ever right.

General Cass was once a great lover of the volunteers. He was a volunteer himself, and was sometimes called the "old volunteer." But now—it was on the records of Congress, and there was no escape from it—he put it to gentlemen on the other side of the House that, at this session of Congress, on December 29th, in the Senate of the United States, General Cass introduced a bill *reducing the pay of the volunteers for commutation for their clothing one-third.*

Mr. WICK interposed; but

Mr. STEWART declined to yield the floor, as his hour was fast running away. He would show gentlemen the bill; here it was, as it appeared on the records of the Senate:

"*In the Senate of the United States, December* 29, 1847.

"Mr. CASS, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported the following bill, which was read and passed:

"A Bill to provide clothing for volunteers in the service of the United States.

"*Be it enacted, &c.*, That, in lieu of the money which under existing laws is allowed to volunteers as a commutation for clothing, the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to cause the volunteers to be furnished with clothing, in kind, at the same rates, according to grades, as is provided for the troops of the regular army."

The bill provided "that, *in lieu of the* money," "clothing in kind" be furnished to the volunteers at the same rates, according to grade, as was provided for the regular army. Now, here was a letter which he had received from the Adjutant General, stating what the allowance to the regulars was:

"ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, June* 16, 1848.

"SIR: In reply to your inquiry of the 15th instant, I respectfully inform you that the average allowance of clothing per month to soldiers of the regular army is about $2 35. I enclose herewith a copy of "General Order No. 10," current series, in which you will find specified the articles of clothing, and their value, for each year of the term of enlistment.

"Respectfully, R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

"To the Hon. A. STEWART, *House of Representatives, Washington.*"

This $2 35 was to all grades—dragoons, artillery-men, &c.; but, by examination of the "general orders" referred to by the Adjutant General, he found that the whole amount of clothing for *infantry* for five years was $114 55½, which by computation, it would be seen, gave $1 91 per month to the infantry, and no more. Thus it appeared that this bill of Gen. Cass reduced the allowance to infantry volunteers for clothing from $3 50, allowed by the act of 1846, to $1 91, the amount allowed to the infantry of the regular army. The "Union," it was true, and Mr. CAMERON, said the volunteers could have their option; but the language of the bill was express; nobody could mistake it; it was that this "clothing in kind" should be furnished "*in lieu* of the money

which under existing laws is allowed." Now, could you find any *option* there? The bill provided that clothing, which cost $1 91 per month, should be furnished *in lieu* of the $3 50 allowed under previous laws.

Mr. McClelland interposed, and was understood to speak of the construction put upon the law by the Adjutant General; but what he said was not caught by the Reporter.

Mr. Stewart said he cared not what *construction* the Adjutant General had been induced to give the law by Gen. Cass or any body else; there was the law as it was reported by Gen. Cass, and as it passed. He knew it was said that Gen. Cass had seen the Adjutant General and got him or the President to nullify by construction, or veto the law *ex post facto;* he might have found it would not do to strip the volunteers of their clothing; hanging and burning in effigy might have been unpleasant; and the Adjutant General might have been induced lately, (some six or seven weeks ago,) too late, to construe this law of General Cass directly contrary to its provisions. But there was the law as introduced by General Cass and passed, which expressly provided for this change, and that the $1 91, "clothing in kind," should be furnished "*in lieu*" of the amount previously allowed, which was $3 50. If it was intended to give them their election, as is now pretended, why did not Gen. Cass say so in his bill; why not say that the volunteers should be allowed to draw $1 91, the amount of clothing allowed to regulars, which should be deducted out of the $3 50 to which they were entitled, and not as the law declares "*in lieu*" of the $3 50? The $1 91 was not to be in part, but in *full*. The law was too plain. Ingenuity could not mystify it. It was not only outrageously unjust, but it was clearly unconstitutional and void. What right had Gen. Cass to report and pass a law "impairing the obligation of contracts." The Government had contracted to pay the volunteers $8 per month and $3 50 for clothing; the volunteers had agreed to take it, and had gone to Mexico. What right, then, had Gen. Cass to reduce their pay one-third? If he could constitutionally take away one-third, he could take away the whole. No; the law was unjust; it was unconstitutional and void; and, when opposed and spurned, and its author hung in effigy, it was abandoned and given up. But we are asked how this bill came to pass both Houses without opposition? He answered, because no one knew the amount received by the regulars; this was fixed by an army order; and, it being stated that it was a bill "for the benefit of the volunteers," it passed at once without inquiry or opposition. Such is the brief history of this shameful and unjust law. What would the volunteers, the people, say to the man who would take $30 per day whilst enjoying all the luxuries of civilized life, and who would rob the honest and brave volunteer of one-third of his pittance of $3 50 per month for clothing? Not enough to purchase a hat or pair of boots. Would Old Zack have done this? No, sir; he would have given his hat and shoes both to an old soldier, rather than take a single cent from him, justly or unjustly.

And there was another thing to which he wished to call the especial attention of gentlemen. Gen. Cass was said to be a friend to economy. He was a very great economist. He takes especial care of the people's money—especially when he gets it in his own pocket. [Laughter.] He had some proofs on this subject to which he would refer the committee, and he called upon gentlemen to examine the official documents which he should produce. General Cass, it was known, was once Governor of Michigan and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs, appointed under a special law, with a fixed salary of $2,000 per annum. He was appointed Governor, and was ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs just as the President of the United States is President and ex-officio Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy; and he would ask gentlemen had the one any more right to extra pay than the other? But

Governor Cass not only drew his salary while he held that office, between seventeen and eighteen years, but he charged extra compensation while drawing his salary of $2,000 per annum, amounting to the enormous sum of $60,412 over and above his salary. He would read to the committee some of the items to show what the character of these charges were, which he had derived from official and authentic sources, and which could not, and he presumed would not, be controverted on this floor:

Extra charges by Governor Cass as Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs, over and above his regular salary, as per document No. 224, 1839, 3d session, 25th Congress, page 2.

From October 9, 1813, to May 29, 1822, (9 years,) ten rations per day, (20 cents each)	$6,610
From October 9, 1813, to July 31, 1831, $1,500 per annum, extra salary	26,715
	$33,325
falsely said to be allowed by Mr. Calhoun six years after he was out of office.	
Document No. 112, same session, page 15, partly embraced in subsequent accounts	4,750
55 days, at $8 per diem, travelling expenses, 40 cents per mile, in concluding treaties at Greenville, 1814, St. Mary's, (1818,) Saginaw and Sault de St. Marie, and making arrangements with the Wyandots, &c., from 1817 to 1820, as per document No. 6, 3d session, 27th Congress, pages 11 and 12, (being extra compensation,) 50 *days preparing before and after treaty*	2,476
Per diem, 52 days, mileage, &c. ($8 per day and 40 cents per mile) at the treaty of Chicago, in 1821	696
For attendance at Washington in 1821-'22 (208 days) to settle his own accounts, and mileage, (10 rations per day,) and $1,032 travelling expenses	1,448
Extra services as commissioner to treat with the Indians at Wapaghkonetta, and at Prairie du Chien, in 1825, 29 days, daily pay and mileage, $356, taking treaty to Washington $2,092	2,448
Similar services in Indiana in 1826, 46 days	552
Similar services in Fond du Lac in 1826, 65 days	1,360
Similar services at Butte des Mortes in 1827, 60 days	960
Similar services at Green Bay in 1828, 66 days	1,112
Similar services at St. Joseph's in 1827, 10 days	240
Services and expenses in Washington city, in 1828, preparing a code for the regulation of Indian Affairs, and mileage, 111 days	1,520
Services for superintending Indian agencies at Piqua, Fort Wayne, and Chicago, for the years 1822-'3-'4-'5-'6-'7-'8, at $1,500 per annum	10,500
Similar services, same agencies, 1829-'30, and part of 1831, at $1,500 per annum	3,875
Total extra charges	$60,412

It would appear from this statement, made from documents specially referred to, (and which, if wrong, can be corrected by Gen. Cass's friends,) that he charged and received pay four times for the same period of time:

1st. His regular salary as governor and *ex officio* superintendent of Indian Affairs of the Territory of Michigan, $2,000 per annum for about 18 years	$36,000
2d. Fifteen hundred per annum extra salary from 1813 to 1831, nearly 18 years, *paid* in 1831	26,715
Rations—ten rations per day at 20 cents each for between nine and ten years	6,610
3d. Fifteen hundred dollars per annum extra salary from 1821 to 1831, about ten years, *being part of the above* 18 *years*	14,375
4th. Specific charges for 772 days of the above time, at $8 per day and 40 cents mileage, in attending at Indian treaties, at Washington to settle his own accounts, and for extra pay as above, preparing an Indian code, &c., being upwards of $16 per day for the time specified above	12,712
Total	$96,412

This last charge, with his three salaries, one fixed at $2,000, and two extra salaries of $1,500 each, would make his pay for this period amount to $11,355 per annum—more than $31 per day, Sundays and all, exclusive of his rations, taken from the pockets of the tax-paying people of the United States by Gen. Cass for his services as governor and superintendent of Indian affairs for the Territory of Michigan, at a fixed salary of $2,000 per annum. If such were his extras as a territorial governor, what will they be as President? At the same rate they will amount to upwards of $60,000 per annum, which he

would have just as good a right to claim as ex-officio commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. Where is the difference?

In connexion with this, there was the fact that some of these accounts were made out and certified when he was himself Secretary of War; but, not liking to pass his own accounts, he left them for his successor, with the endorsement that they were authorized and correct. And yet Gen. Cass was a great economist! He subscribed to the Baltimore maxim that "the people's money must be carefully guarded for the people's benefit." But he (Mr. S.) thought the General had in this case rather "overstepped the modesty of nature," whatever the opinions of others might be. But this was not all that General Cass had received. Besides the above, received as Governor of Michigan and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs, he was about five years Secretary of War at $6,000 per annum, being a total of $30,000. He was subsequently some six years minister to St. Cloud at $9,000 per annum, being $54,000, with an outfit of $9,000 and an infit of $4,500—making a total of some $97,500. The amount of extra charges during his travels in Europe and to the Holy Land he had not yet ascertained; he presumed they were considerable. Add to these sums his per diem and mileage as Senator from Michigan, his pay as an officer during the late war with Great Britain, and it would present an aggregate of between two and three hundred thousand dollars of the people's money. Enough he thought to satisfy any reasonable man; but it seemed not; he wants one or two hundred thousand more as President. Of the private conduct and character of Gen. Cass he would say nothing, but his official conduct was a fair and legitimate subject of discussion, and he would not shrink from the discharge of his duty, be the consequences to himself what they might. It was to the extra charges he wished to call the especial attention of his friends, and he would be glad if they could furnish some satisfactory explanation of these extraordinary charges, which he feared they could not and would not give.

He hoped the friends of Gen. Cass would examine these matters, and be able to give some explanation of them. The people of this country would expect it to be cleared up some how or other, though he believed it would be found that there were no vouchers to sustain these extra charges—not the oath of a single witness to establish their justice, but they were left to depend mainly if not altogether on the statements by Gen. Cass himself, on his own *ipse dixit*. But his hour was fast wasting away and he must hurry on.

There was another thing to which he desired to refer. If he had the time he would like to refer to the expenditures during the present war with Mexico. He, however, had not the time to refer satisfactorily to this wasteful expenditure of money. There had been much of it squandered amongst Presidential partisans and favorites; some rewarded with high offices, such as Pillow & Co., and others with fat contracts. They had paid for the hire of steamboats alone $351,631 a month, and the sum of $115,900 had been paid for old and worthless vessels. But he had not time to refer to these matters in detail, which he had before him; he might put them in his speech should he ever write it out. But he must hasten to advert to another thing, which would show how the great economists of this Administration spent "the people's money for the people's benefit." His attention had been called to the fact that this Government has been expending the people's money for the benefit of hundreds of their partisans and pets for actually doing nothing; and in many of the custom-houses in the country at this time the receipts were wholly inadequate to the payment of the officers who were quartered on the public. For instance, there were fifty custom-houses, of which he had made a list, that collected the sum of $74,425.77; to collect which an expense was incurred of $361,075.39 over and above the entire receipts of the offices—a clear loss to the Treasury of this amount to support the party; making, therefore, an expenditure of $435,501.-

16 paid to support custom-houses that paid not one cent into the Treasury. There were twenty-one custom-houses whose aggregate receipts were $32,218.39, the whole of which, together with $270,280.28, was paid to a set of idle officers ostensibly employed in its collection, but actually doing little or nothing; a gross sum, without any receipts to meet the expenditures, of $302,498.67 thrown away on favorites! There were likewise *ten* custom-houses which collected the sum of $867.19 only, which cost the Government $36,248.32, or $35,381.13 over and above the whole receipts. And that was using "the people's money for the people's benefit," according to the Baltimore resolutions. Oh, say they, you must take care to spend the people's money for the people's benefit, and here, as an example, was an expenditure of $36,248.32 to collect $867.19! If gentlemen had any doubt on this subject he had before him a transcript from the official statements, made out by an officer of this House, which he would hand to the Reporter; he had not time now to read it. Here is a portion of the list:

Statement showing the gross amount of revenue collected in the following districts, and the excess of expenditure beyond the duties received for the year 1845–'6.

Districts.	Gross revenue.	Excess of expenditures beyond receipts.
Frenchman's Bay	$415 33	$14,506 46
Waldoborough	2,145 79	18,798 05
Kennebunk	592 33	2,740 18
Saco	191 87	1,810 85
York	323 74	1,166 99
Plymouth	1,825 14	25,716 02
Ipswich	Nothing.	124 87
Edgartown	298 15	2,303 21
Barnstable	2,845 63	44,819 77
New London	614 25	11,946 03
Stonington	351 48	2,269 81
Oswegatchie	385 71	2,399 67
Cape Vincent	779 40	3,426 18
Presque Isle	312 66	8,996 97
Delaware	1,591 42	22,447 63
St. Mary's	2 82	159 68
Yeocomico	157 79	331 21
Tappahannock	132 06	1,684 54
Ocracoke	56 27	2,034 25
Beaufort, S. C	7 00	243 00
Brunswick	1 36	110 32
St. Mary's	75 38	4,078 56
St. Augustine	160 70	1,686 12
St. Mark's	195 01	6,157 67
St. John's	50 02	3,955 43
Pearl River	197 35	351 03
Vicksburg	30 71	480 29
Miami	48 84	1,289 32
	$13,788 21	$185,034 11

Old Zack, he trusted, would soon make this list of drones and cormorants "small by degrees, and beautifully less;" for, if there was any one trait in his character more strongly developed than any other, it was his love of *economy*, and his abhorrence of every thing like extravagance and wasteful expenditure, and especially of the public money. In matters of this kind he understood he was peculiarly rigid and exact; and it is now, in these times of profligacy and wanton waste, that the country and the tax-paying people want such an honest and faithful man as General Taylor to muster and inspect the crew, dismiss the idle and useless, put "the ship to rights," get it fairly before the wind, and with a noble crew, and well selected subordinates, our noble ship of State would

soon surmount every obstacle, and be once more safely moored in the haven of peace and prosperity.

The Baltimore Convention speak, in their resolutions, with great exultation of their Mexican war and their Mexican peace. And what have we got by the one or by the other? This war has thrown this country back full half a century. Look at its demoralizing effects; look what it has cost in blood and treasure. And, for all this, what have we got? Nothing; I fear worse than nothing. Sir, the pecuniary cost of this war, and this was by no means its greatest cost, would not fall short—past, present, and prospective—of some two or three hundred millions of dollars.

Cost already incurred, say	$100,000,000
Land bounties	15,000,000
Amount paid Mexico, debt and money	20,000,000
Addition to pension list, two millions for twenty-five years	50,000,000
Standing army to defend the northern frontier of Mexico, and maintaining our new possessions there, five millions per year for ten years	50,000,000
Increase of army, navy, &c., at home, five millions per annum, say ten years	50,000,000
Incidental expenses, damages, losses, &c., to be provided for hereafter, say	10,000,000
	$295,000,000

What would this not have accomplished, had it been expended for the improvement of our country? What countless benefits and blessings, instead of curses and calamities, would it not have conferred upon the American people? They are more easily conceived than described; he would not, in his brief hour, attempt it—he would leave every one to make the calculation for himself.

To the above add the loss of time and labor to the country of fifty thousand volunteers for two years, and the loss to families, and to the country, of fifteen or twenty thousand valuable lives. And, he repeated, for all this what have we gained? New Mexico and California, which will cost us every year, to maintain and defend, as much as it is worth. And where is our promised "indemnity for the past and security for the future?" Indemnity! We have none, not a cent for all our losses; but Mexico has received "indemnity for the past," by a release of the five millions of debt which Mr. Polk made the war to recover, and fifteen millions in cash; and as to "security for the future," we have none. But what has Mexico? She has security for the future. We are bound to protect her northern frontier against the hostile and predatory incursions of the Indians of California, now ours, heretofore a source of so much annoyance, expense, and suffering to her people. From these calamities she is to be hereafter protected, not by her own, but by American armies; so that, in point of fact, Mexico, and not Mr. Polk, has got all the "indemnity for the past and security for the future."

Such are the benefits of our war, and the blessings of our peace, of which we hear so much boasting on the other side of the House. Sir, but for the madness and folly of this Administration, all we have got could have been obtained, by wise counsels and amicable negotiation, for some fifteen or twenty millions. Who can doubt it? But, no; nothing but war and bloodshed would satisfy the President; he would "cavil on the ninth part of a hair;" he would not consent to change the title of our negotiator sent to Mexico, (Mr. Slidell,) from "minister plenipotentiary" to "commissioner," which was all that was required to secure his recognition by Mexico, and the opening of negotiations for peace. Rather than comply with this reasonable request, he instantly ordered Gen. Taylor to march to the Rio Grande, and thus commenced the war without consulting Congress, then in session; thereby fixing on Polk and his party the responsibility—the fearful responsibility—of this war, and all its consequences.

But there was another grave objection he had to the policy of this Administration. Our Government, as now administered, has, in effect, become a *foreign Government*. We could now do every thing abroad, and nothing at

home. The American people were taxed for the benefit of foreigners. The millions raised to carry on this war had been expended for the most part in a foreign country. Internal improvements were unconstitutional at home, but not abroad; we could survey and of course improve the Dead Sea; we could make roads and canals across the isthmus of Panama and Tehuantepec. If we want goods they must come from abroad. American hats, shoes, and coats were not good enough for this Administration; they reduced the duties and brought them from abroad. A proposition was actually made by his colleague, (Mr. C. J. INGERSOLL,) and sustained by his party, a few days ago, to take half the present reduced duties off the rich man's luxuries, jewelry, silks, laces, lawns, gewgaws, and every thing of the kind, and off iron, coal, cloth, hats, shoes, and every species of manufacture, reducing them from 30 to 15 per cent., and reducing, of course, the revenue one-half, expressly to favor *foreigners*, who were represented by his colleague to be in a suffering condition, (no matter about Americans;) and then, to make up for loss of revenue, it was proposed to put a duty of twenty-five per cent. on the poor man's tea and coffee. Such is their love of the dear poor people—perfectly in character with all the rest—preaching one thing, and practising the opposite.

Thus, sir, every thing done by these "progressives" inure to the benefit of foreigners. Our money is sent in ship loads abroad; our improvements are foreign; our goods are foreign; our army and our navy are employed abroad. Every thing is *foreign, foreign;* nothing American. No power to protect or benefit our own people, or improve our own country. The power to contract debts, to tax and oppress the people, were the only legitimate powers of Government as now administered. Was this not true to the letter? Would the people longer submit to this state of things? The power and the remedy was in their own hands, and they would apply it, by elevating that honest, true-hearted American, General Taylor, to the Presidency, who would soon correct these foreign and anti-American tendencies, and bring the country back to the good old revolutionary principles, and the true *American* policy of the earlier and better days of the Republic.

The Baltimore platform had a great many things in it to which his brief remaining time would not permit him even to allude. He saw, amongst other things, they had a resolution in which they repeated the President's charge that the Whigs gave "aid and comfort to the enemy." Now, he would like to know what sort of "aid and comfort" old Zack gave to the enemy? Mr. Polk sent Santa Anna to give them aid and comfort; while, instead of aid, General Taylor gave them "a little more grape and canister." He wished the gentlemen opposite to make the most of the "aid and comfort" humbug; old Zack had spiked that cannon, or rather had turned it upon their own ranks, now flying like the Mexicans before him.

In the next place, they go in for a sound currency; and yet the party, after the destruction of the United States Bank, had established six or seven hundred State Banks. This has been done by Democratic Legislatures in Democratic States. He had a list of these banks, showing where, when, and by whom incorporated, but had not time to introduce them now; he might do it on some other occasion; this, however, was perfectly consistent with all they did. They make an outcry against bank paper, and they fill the country with illegitimate paper money, issued in violation of the Constitution, which expressly declared that no State should "issue bills of credit;" and of course they could not authorize others to do what the States themselves were not authorized to do. This provision, Mr. Madison (in the Federalist) says, was inserted for the very purpose of preventing the States from issuing or authorizing the issue of "*paper money.*" He (Mr. S.) was not a bank man. We had too many banks. He was opposed to a United States Bank, though he had

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once voted for it in obedience to the unan[illegible] ratic Pennsylvania Legislature, and when every Democratic member from Pennsylvania in this House but one voted in favor of this same United States Bank, now regarded with such "holy horror" by these gentlemen.

Next, the Baltimore platform declares that the present Administration had given "a noble impulse to *free trade*," by repealing the tariff of 1842 and establishing that of 1846. This was announced as the crowning merit and glory of Mr. Polk's Administration. It was too late to enter upon that subject, for his time was almost expired; but he would merely observe, that their system had been so successful as to produce a balance of perhaps some forty millions against the country. Specie was, in consequence, going out of the country at the rate of three millions a month from the port of New York alone, and goods were coming in by millions; and he would tell them, while their imports are vastly increased under the tariff of 1846, that their exports were falling, greatly falling off. The exports of breadstuffs will not be one-tenth part of what they were last year, Mr. Walker's predictions to the contrary notwithstanding; and, judging from what he saw in the last *Union*, they would become less than that. The "Union" of yesterday states the exports to Great Britain of flour last year at 2,269,114 barrels, this year 159,191; wheat last year 2,157,448 bushels, this year 215,139, and so on; and yet gentlemen talked of evidence of the worth of their system. Where was it, and what was it? A crisis is approaching; it will soon be upon us. The result of such a system would be such as they had in 1840; it will crush the banks, the people, and the country—producing the scenes and sufferings of 1840, which can neither be forgotten nor averted. The famine and the revolutions in Europe have postponed this crisis; the expenses of the war had also helped; but the crisis is coming, and must come. While exports are falling off they boast of increased imports and increasing revenue under low duties—thus boasting of that which must bring inevitable ruin. You have taken off one-third of the duties by the tariff of 1846; of course, to get the same amount of revenue, you must increase your imports one-third, say fifty millions, and send fifty millions of dollars out of the country to pay for them; and, what is still worse, you must destroy fifty millions of your present home supply of manufactures to make room for the additional fifty millions brought from abroad; hence, it is manifest, that for fifty millions of money sent abroad to enrich foreigners at the expense of Americans, we get—not even one cent of additional revenue. Who, then, is benefitted? *Foreigners*—they gain fifty millions of our money, and Americans lose it. But, if we are getting more revenue, as is alleged, so much the worse; this can only be by increasing the mischief—increasing our imports of goods and exports of money. To increase the revenue under reduced duties, he insisted, was but to hasten the crisis, and aggravate the ruin and disasters that must follow.

The Baltimore Convention next boasted of this glorious war with Mexico. They were welcome to all its glories, with all its responsibilities. The policy of the Whigs was peace, and not war. The policy of the Whigs, too, was economy, and not extravagance; and if Gen. Taylor, that faithful and true patriot, should come into power—which no man could doubt—if, he repeated, Gen. Taylor should come into power—a man into whose face, we are told by Generals Smith and Twiggs, no man could look and make a dishonorable proposition—he would bring back the policy of government to what it was in the early days of the Republic, when Washington, Jefferson, and Madison presided over its destinies. Taylor, this second Washington, would bring back this Government to the purer principles and better policy of the first. Thank God that period is approaching; it is at hand; already its approach is heralded by——

Here the Chairman's hammer announced the expiration of Mr. S's hour, and he took his seat.